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ABSTRACT
Soteria is a user right management system designed to safeguard
user-data privacy in a transparent and provable manner in compli-
ance to regulations such as GDPR and CCPA. Soteria represents
user data rights as formal executable sharing agreements, which
can automatically be translated into a human readable form and
enforced as data are queried. To support revocation and to prove
compliance, an indelible, audited trail of the hash of data access
and sharing agreements are stored on a two-layer distributed ledger.
The main chain ensures partition tolerance and availability (PA)
properties while side chains ensure consistency and availability
(CA), thus providing the three properties of the CAP (consistency,
availability, and partition tolerance) theorem. Besides depicting the
two-layer architecture of Soteria, this paper evaluates representa-
tive consensus protocols and reports performance statistics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to improve the qual-
ity of many application domains. In order to effectively train AI
models, an application typically requires large quantities of per-
sonal information (PI) from users. To address data privacy issues,
regulations such as GDPR [1] and CCPA [3] in the general domain
and HIPAA in the medical domain need to be upheld. The eight
rights of GDPR and the six of CCPA can be summarized into three
categories: 1) right to consent, rectify, and delete; 2) right to be
informed; and 3) right to access and transfer.
• Consent: users must explicitly opt-in and always have the
ability to opt-out of PI collection.
• Informed: users have the right to know how their PI is col-
lected, used, and shared.
• Access: users have the right to access his/her own data, trans-
fer data to another person or entity, and erase data.
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Businesses are required to comply with the consumer rights in a
provable way. A robust privacy-preserving PI governance platform
is needed to ensure that all transactions (including permission, re-
vocation, data access, and deletion) on PI leave indelible and con-
sistent records for public audit. Provability is essential in the court
of law to resolve he-said-she-said cases.
To protect privacy rights in a provable manner, we propose So-
teria, a user-right management system with a distributed ledger
platform. The user-right management system provides a formal
end-to-end solution that automatically maps user agreements in
natural language into formal compliance code. Our executable
sharing agreements (ESA) are a formal representation of sharing
agreements that can specify a superset of the rights protected un-
der GDPR and CCPA. These agreements can be translated into
plain language automatically so users can understand them; they
are translated into formal Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) for-
mulas for enforcement. We use a distributed ledger to support au-
ditability and revocability. We create an indelible trail of records
by creating a log of every agreement signed and every query made,
and a hash of the log is stored on the distributed ledger.
Soteria ensures performance scalability in terms of both latency
and throughput. Soteria employs a multi-layer blockchain archi-
tecture (we previously proposed in [24]) to allow all three CAP
(consistency, availability, and partition tolerance) properties [11]
to be simultaneously satisfied. The base-layer blockchain guaran-
tees PA (partition tolerance and availability) properties to ensure
scalability, whereas the side chains guarantee CA (consistency and
availability) properties to ensures provability. We detail our proto-
col selections for the base blockchain and side chains in Section 3.
The rest of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2
defines depicts Soteria’s architecture and its user right management
system. Section 3 presents and qualitatively evaluates four repre-
sentative consensus protocols that satisfy consistency and availabil-
ity (CA) requirements of Soteria’s side chains. In Section 4, we
report our quantitative performance evaluation on Tendermint and
Stellar protocols and justify our selection of Tendermint. We offer
our concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. ARCHITECTURE OF SOTERIA
We use the terms user and consumer interchangeably to refer to
the owner of data. (Data consumer is the term defined in CCPA
to refer to an application user whose data the regulation aims to
protect.) We use business and company to refer to the collector and
custodian of user/consumer data. A user, and a business with that
user’s consent, can access the data collected from the user stored at
the business.
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Figure 1: Soteria Components: URM, DTL, and ATS.
2.1 Components and Design Goals
Figure 1 depicts components of Soteria: URM, DTL, and ATS.
• User right management (URM): URM stores information
about all user data and metadata that are collected and stored
by a company.
• Distributed ledger (DTL): DTL is our multi-layer blockchain
that satisfies Soteria’s requirements including privacy,
throughput and latency.
• Audit trail service (ATS): ATS stores incurred transactions
on data items for transparent auditing.
Soteria is designed to address each of the following challenges:
1. Today users are asked to consent to long hard-to-read agree-
ments. How can we write agreements that can be understand-
able to users?
2. How do we ensure that the agreements users sign translate
into a faithful implementation?
3. Consumers are not expected to keep records of all the agree-
ments signed, how can a company prove that it is compliant?
In particular, how do we ensure that no accesses to revoked
data are performed?
While Section 3 depicts the the ledger design in DTL for ad-
dressing the provability requirement, the remainder of this section
presents how URM complies with regulations of consent, informed,
and access described in Section 1.
2.2 ESA: Executable Sharing Agreement
In existing systems, users are required to agree to long docu-
ments that are not understandable. Furthermore, because these
agreements are expressed in natural language, which can be am-
biguous, it is not clear what the effect of the agreements, or whether
a certain company is truly in compliance. Instead, we propose ex-
ecutable sharing agreement (ESA), which have a well-defined un-
ambiguous semantics; that is, whether a specific transaction com-
plies with the agreement can be verified automatically. Further-
more, ESAs can automatically be converted into natural language
unambiguously. This ensures that the contract is understandable to
users and auditors.
Our ESA notation is inspired by the previously proposed
ThingTalk language, designed originally for personal data shar-
ing [16]. The syntax of an ESA is as follows:
γ,pi(r, p):[ f1, f2, . . .] of d,pi( f1, f2, . . .)
This statement reads as follows: “for consumer γ , the fields
f1, f2, . . . from domain d can be shared with any requester r for
purpose p, provided that the predicates pi(r, p) and pi( f1, f2, . . .) are
satisfied.
So, for example, to express that they are willing to share their ab-
normal PSA (a protein called prostate-specific antigen) with Stan-
ford Medical Center, including their age and ethnicity but not their
name, and only for research purposes, a patient named “Bob” might
issue an ESA agreement of the form:
γ = “Bob”,r = “Stanford Medical Center”∧ p = research :
[age,ethnicity,PSA] of EHR,PSA≥ 2
2.2.1 Translating to and from Natural Language
As consumers are not expected to understand formal languages,
the ESA notation is designed to provide a natural language inter-
face. The sharing agreements can be translated from formal to nat-
ural language using a rule-based translation. The previous example
can be expressed in natural language as follows:
“Stanford Medical Center can read the age, ethnic-
ity and PSA of Bob’s EHR for research and if the PSA
is greater than or equal to 2.”
While the automatically generated sentences can be verbose and
clunky due to the rule-based translation, they are understandable,
and they are guaranteed to correspond exactly to the code of the
agreement. Furthermore, the ESA notation is designed so that a
user can define their own sharing agreement in natural language.
Previous work has shown that it is possible to automatically trans-
late natural language access controls into attribute-based policies
for personal data sharing [15, 16], and the same semantic parsing
technology is used here. Thorough analysis of semantic parsing is
out of scope for this paper.
2.3 ESA Enforcement
All writes to and reads from the database containing user data
must go through the Soteria interface which ensures compliance to
all the sharing agreements, which represent user consent. Soteria
automatically includes an owner field for each row of the database.
Every database access is rewritten to include the sharing agree-
ments constraints; it is timestamped and logged for later auditing.
2.3.1 Verification of SQL Queries for Auditing
To prove compliance to an external auditor, Soteria stores the re-
quester, the purpose and the final query, right before it is issued to
the database, including all the clauses related to the sharing agree-
ments. Using the set of the sharing agreements in force at the time,
the auditor can then formally verify that the query was compliant.
Given a query from requester r for purpose p in the audit logs of
the form:
SELECT f¯ FROM t WHERE pi
and sharing agreements of the form:
γ1,pi1(r, p): [ f1, f2, . . .] of t,pi1( f1, f2, . . .)
γ2,pi2(r, p): [ f1, f2, . . .] of t,pi2( f1, f2, . . .)
. . .
the query is compliant if and only if
pi |=(γ = γ1∧pi1(r, p)∧pi1( f1, f2, . . .))∨
(γ = γ2∧pi2(r, p)∧pi2( f1, f2, . . .))∨ . . .
This logical formula can be verified efficiently using a satisfiability
modulo theory (SMT) solver [8].
2.3.2 Formally Verified SQL Query
To ensure that all queries are compliant, Soteria uses the follow-
ing algorithm to construct a query that is guaranteed by construc-
tion to satisfy the sharing agreements. Given a SQL query from
requester r for purpose p of the form:
SELECT f¯ FROM t WHERE pi
and sharing agreements of the form:
γ1,pi1(r, p): [ f1, f2, . . .] of t,pi1( f1, f2, . . .)
γ2,pi2(r, p): [ f1, f2, . . .] of t,pi2( f1, f2, . . .)
. . .
Soteria constructs a query of the form:
SELECT f¯ ∩{ f1, f2, . . .} FROM t WHERE pi AND
(γ = γ1 AND pi1(r, p) AND pi1( f1, f2, . . .))OR
(γ = γ2 AND pi2(r, p) ANDpi2( f1, f2, . . .))OR . . .,
where γ is the field in the table containing the owner of that row.
It is possible to prove that the result set of this query is consistent
with the sharing agreement. Only the fields allowed by the agree-
ment are returned, and a row is included only if the predicates in
the sharing agreement in force for the row owner are satisfied.
We note that the SQL query, while correct, might not be very ef-
ficient, as it includes at least one clause for each owner of the data
in the database. In our experience, this is sufficient, as in practice
the same sharing agreement is used by many different consumers,
so clauses can be unified when the query is constructed. As con-
sumers’ preferences become more fine-grained, this might not be
the case. Future work should investigate an optimization algorithm
or an index structure suitable to queries of this form, so that both
performance and formal correctness can be maintained.
2.3.3 Enforcing Requester and Purpose
A data requester can be an application user defined in CCPA or
a company that stores user data. The URM component of Soteria
does not verify the identity of the data requester. Such verifica-
tion should be handled by the data transport protocol, and is out of
scope of the Soteria protocol. Figure 1 shows that applications out-
side the Soteria box handles user registration and authentication.
Soteria does not mandate any specific transport protocol; meaning-
ful protocols could be REST, could be messaging-based [16], or
could even be through physical media.
Furthermore, Soteria does not verify the purpose of the data ac-
cess. The design assumes that at identification time, the data trans-
port protocol will also compute the allowed purpose of data access.
For example, using REST data transport, a medical data requester
could be issued two different access tokens, one for clinical pur-
poses and the other for research purposes. The correct purpose can
be established through an existing business agreement between the
data provider and data requester. If the data requester then uses the
data in a manner inconsistent with the agreed purpose, the provider
can use Soteria to establish that the fault lies with the requester.
2.3.4 Enforcing Access on Write
To support limiting what data is stored by a business entity such
as AWS, queries that manipulate data (insert, update, delete) are
also intercepted by Soteria, and modified to match the ESA that
limit the storage of data. Write queries that are not allowed by any
ESA are not executed and are not logged.
To support permanent deletion of the data upon request by the
consumer, the data itself (included in the VALUES and SET clauses
of the insert and update queries) is masked in the audit log, as the
audit log is immutable and append-only. For this reason, an ESA
about data storage that depend on the specific values cannot be au-
dited after the fact. Soteria disallows such ESA: only the set of
fields to write can be controlled.
Continuing the previous example, the patient might issue a fol-
lowing the data storage ESA:
γ = “Bob” : [age,ethnicity,PSA,phone,medication]
of EHR.write
This ESA allows age, ethnicity, PSA readings, contact information
and current medications to be stored. It does not allow any other
column to be stored, so the following query:
INSERT INTO EHR SET person = “Bob”, age = 52,
ethnicity = white, PSA = 1.5, phone = “555-555-5555”,
smoker = TRUE, consumesAlcohol = FALSE, . . .
would be rewritten as the following:
INSERT INTO EHR SET person = “Bob”, age = 52,
ethnicity = white, PSA = 1.5, phone = “555-555-5555”,
smoker = NULL, consumesAlcohol = NULL, . . .
Deletions are a special case of write, because they reduce the
data that is stored about a specific customer rather than store new
data. Hence, deletion is always allowed regardless of the current
ESA. All deletions are logged, to prove that they were executed
properly.
Additionally, upon revoking an ESA about data storage, some
columns that were previously allowed might becomes disallowed.
In that case, Soteria overwrites the data to set those columns to
NULL. In case all columns are now disallowed, such as when all
ESAs for a customer are revoked, Soteria deletes the row entirely.
Both the database write (update or delete) and the ESA revocation
are logged for later auditing.
2.4 ESA Storage and Audit
To support long-term auditability, as well as revocation of con-
tracts, Soteria makes use of a distributed ledger (blockchain) to
track which sharing agreements are in force. The use of the
blockchain provides a global ordering of all the events across all
parties in the system; the events include issuing a sharing agree-
ment, accessing the data, and revoking a sharing agreement. This
global ordering ensures it is always possible to verify whether a
sharing agreement was in force when a data transaction occurred,
without disputes.
Sharing agreements can potentially be privacy-sensitive them-
selves; for example, the sharing agreement in the previous section
can reveal that the patient is likely to be male. For this reason, So-
teria only stores the hash of the sharing agreement code, and the
hash of each transaction, in the public blockchain. Upon request
by a competent authority (e.g. under subpoena in a civil dispute), a
data provider using Soteria can reveal the full audit logs, including
the full code of the sharing agreements, and the exact transactions
performed. These logs can be then matched to the hashes stored in
the public blockchain to verify that they were not tampered with.
Soteria includes three types of events in the blockchain:
1. Sharing Agreement Deployment (ESAD). An ESAD event
occurs when a new sharing agreement is created between a
consumer who controls the data, and a provider who owns
it. An ESAD transaction on the blockchain (ESAD-TX) in-
cludes the PI owner’s address, data provider’ address, the
hash of the agreement code, ESA deployment date, and ESA
validity status (set to true).
2. Data Transaction (DATA-TX). A data transaction indicates
the transfer of data between a data provider and a data re-
quester. DATA-TX records in the blockchain include the ad-
dress of the data provider, the address of the data requester,
and the hash of the exact query executed against the database.
Note that, as described in the previous section, the exact
query will include a reference to the consumers and their
sharing constraints. Hence, given the raw audit logs, paired
with the hash in the blockchain, it is possible to verify that
the query was valid when executed.
3. Sharing Agreement Revocation (ESAR). A sharing agree-
ment can be revoked by a user, making it invalid. Since the
ledger is append-only, a revocation is implemented by cre-
ating a new sharing agreement transaction with the validity
status set to false. Note that a rectification request issued by
a user is executed in two consecutive transactions, an ESAR
to revoke an existing consent and then an ESAD to create a
new consent.
3. DLT CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
Soteria adopts blockchain technology to maintain its distributed
ledgers among several institutions and users. To achieve high
throughput and low latency, Soteria uses a two-layer blockchain.
The base layer is decentralized similar to Ethereum, and its side
chains are entrusted by a group of selected validators, known as ju-
ries. This two-layer approach does not compromise consistency be-
tween the data maintained by Soteria and the data on the providers’
servers, as consistency can always be verified by users on the base-
layer public blockchain. Recall that the CAP theorem [11] states
that a distributed database system can only satisfy two of the three
properties: consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. While
the base-layer ensures availability and partition tolerance, the side
chains ensure consistency and availability. Using a permissioned
side chain with a jury pool, Soteria can improve both throughput
and latency by limiting the number of juries. Note that permis-
sioned blockchains are not the same as private blockchains. A per-
missioned blockchain gives the public the right to audit the system
state but only uses a limited number of juries to conduct validation,
whereas a private blockchain does not provide transparency to its
system state.
Soteria’s ledger requires a consensus protocol since it supports
contract revocation. A consensus protocol ensures that all valida-
tors agree on a unique order of transactions on the ledger. Note that
without this strict access permission and access revocation order re-
quirement, an append-only log suffices to support the decentralized
auditability requirement.
There are several types of consensus protocols, each of which
enjoys some pros and suffers some cons. An application selects a
particular consensus protocol for its desired performance objectives
(e.g., latency, throughput, and consistency). For instance, a proto-
col that guarantees immediate consistency may trade latency and
throughput for achieving the consistency objective. A protocol that
requires just weak consistency or eventual consistency can achieve
shorter latency and higher throughput. Specifically, the PoX (proof-
of-something) family protocols [28, 23, 14, 2] such as Proof-of-
Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and Proof-of-Importance (PoI)
offer timely consistency with good network scalability but suffer
from high latency and low transaction throughput. On the contrary,
the BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerance) family protocols offer good
performance with limited scalability w.r.t. the number of valida-
tors. PoX is more suitable for permissionless blockchains (Sote-
ria’s base layer), where BFT for permissioned blockchains (Sote-
ria’s side chains).
In the remainder of this section, we survey representative BFT
consensus protocols including Tendermint [13], Hashgraph [7],
HotStuff [30], and Stellar[26]. We summarize in Section 3.5 a
qualitative comparison.
3.1 Blockchain Overview and Terminologies
A blockchain of height H is composed of a sequence of H blocks.
Each block h, where h = 0, . . . ,H − 1, in a blockchain contains
various numbers of transactions organized into a Merkle tree. The
Merkle tree root of the hth block, denoted as Rh, summarizes the
information in that block. Figure 2 shows an example blockchain.
The hth block, where h ∈ [1, . . . ,H−1] points to its previous block
with pointer Bh. (The first block, or h = 0 is the genesis block.)
Bhis the hash of three components: previous block hash Bh−1, the
Merkle tree root of current block Rh, and some information from
the hth block Th such as timestamp.
Figure 2: Blocks with Hash Pointers
3.2 Base Chain Protocols
Proof-of-something (PoX) protocols aim to support decentral-
ized permissionless blockchains. As mentioned in Section 1, Sote-
ria uses a PoX blockchain as its base chain. The choice of a PoX
protocol depends on the factors of cost and inter-chain consistency
latency, which is defined as the time between when a transaction is
committed on a side-chain and the time when the root of the trans-
action’s Merkle tree is committed on the base chain. Inter-chain
consistency is different from transaction consistency. The former
ensures a consistent public view of transactions for the purpose of
decentralized audits, whereas the latter ensures the validity of indi-
vidual transactions. Transactions committed on a side chain guar-
antees local order on that chain to be consistent. The main chain,
does not guarantee total order all transactions across all side chains.
Once Soteria enforces that a contract revocation must take place on
the same side chain where the contract was agreed upon and vali-
dated, side chain consistency guarantee suffices.
For an access revocation transaction, a side chain of Soteria can
ensure transaction-commit latency to be within seconds. In other
words, once a user revokes a prior permission to access her data,
her data will be inaccessible within seconds. For the purpose of au-
diting, latency is defined as the time required to update side-chain
information on the main chain. This inter-chain consistency latency
is the time between when a transaction commits on a side chain
and when the root of the transaction’s Merkle tree is hashed onto
the main chain. Although Soteria can only guarantee inter-chain
consistency within minutes, this suffices for the auditing purpose
required by regulations1. A PoS (proof-of-stake) protocol such as
Ethereum satisfies latency in minutes at a relatively low cost (com-
pared to e.g., Bitcoin). Therefore, Soteria uses Ethereum as its main
chain.
3.3 Side Chain Protocols
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols are more efficiently
but relatively small in scale in terms of the size of a jury pool (or
the number of voting members) than public blockchains. One ma-
jor milestone of BFT is the deployment of Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT), which is the first implementation that works cor-
rectly in an asynchronous system such as the Internet [17].
PBFT has two modes, normal mode and view-change mode. In
normal mode, a leader proposes a candidate value to the other repli-
cas in the pre-prepare phase. PBFT then goes through two succes-
sive voting phrases: prepare and commit.
1E.g., the CCPA announced in January 2020 requires a data holder
to respond to an audit request in 45 days.
If the candidate value is accepted by a replica pi, as known as a
validator, pi then enters the prepare phase and broadcasts a prepare
message to others consisting the candidate value. Once pi collects
enough messages, i.e., 2 f + 1 messages over 3 f + 1 replicas ( f
denotes the number of Byzantine nodes) and agree on the same
value, it enters into commit phase. In the commit phase, replicas
conduct an election similar to the one in the prepare phase to agree
that more than 2 f replicas will write the candidate value into their
respective databases.
To prevent indefinitely waiting, pi transitions to view-change
mode if a timeout is triggered. In view-change mode, replicas start
a new view to elect a new leader by sending view-change messages.
3.4 BFT/PBFT Protocols and Comparison
Since BFT/PBFT family protocols meet CA properties and per-
formance requirements of Soteria’s side chains, we survey and
compare four representative protocols belonging to this family. For
qualitative comparison documented in Section 3.5, we survey and
present four well-documented protocols, Tendermint, Stellar, Hot-
Stuff, and Hashgraph. Enhancements proposed by some other pro-
tocols (e.g., [10, 19, 27, 21]) stem from these four protocols. In
Section 4 we benchmark two deployed and battle-tested2 protocols,
Tendermint and Stellar, to compare throughput and latency quanti-
tatively. For each protocol, we detail its algorithms and discuss its
advantages and shortcomings.
3.4.1 Tendermint
Tendermint is a leader-based BFT approach that does not con-
duct leader selection, aiming to reduce the number of communica-
tion IOs. Unlike PBFT which is composed of two modes, normal
mode and view-change mode, Tendermint can frequently change
leaders (proposers) and make consensus progress under a single
mode by using a predefined leader selection function. In a nutshell,
the idea of Tendermint to embed view-change mode into normal
mode in PBFT. With this idea, Tendermint reduces the communi-
cation complexity by an order of magnitude compared to PBFT:
from O
(
N3
)
in PBFT to O
(
N2
)
, where N denotes the number of
validators.
For a new block, validators go through several rounds utill they
reach a consensus on that block. Each round consists of four
phases, propose, prevote, precommit, and commit. Tendermint’s
voting process is the same as PBFT’s, in which each validator col-
lects votes from the others between propose and prevote phases and
between precommit and commit phases. Let f denote the number
of Byzantine fault nodes. When over N− f of the same vote have
been collected by a validator, the validator switches from the first
phase to the second phase. Furthermore, Tendermint implements
the following three functions to ensure safety and liveness proper-
ties.
1. Predefined leader selection function. At the beginning of a
new round (propose phase), validators choose a new leader
with this function, which is weighted round-robin against
these validators’ voting power.
2. Timeout function.
As a partially synchronous model, Tendermint triggers a
timeout in between every two phases if a validator can-
not receive enough votes within a specified duration. This
timeout prevents a validator from waiting forever. To
2It is essential for a protocol to have been battle-tested in real-world
deployments to ensure it reaches its claimed performance and fault
tolerance.
adapt to network delay, Tendermint uses a timeout function
timeout (r) = timeout (r−1) + r ∗ ∆, where r is the round
number and ∆ is a configurable constant. The initial time-
out value (r = 0) is set by a configurable constant. When
a timeout occurs, a new round starts with a longer timeout
value.
3. Voting lock mechanism. To validate a block, each validator
maintains two values, a locked value and a valid value. If a
validator pi sends a precommit message with a valid v value
(v 6= nil), it locks v as its locked value. If a validator pi re-
ceives N− f prevote messages with the same valid value v,
it updates its valid value with v. Also, if the proposer al-
ready has had a valid value, it proposes only this value to
other validators. That valid value is regarded as the most re-
cent possible value. Once a locked value vlocked,i is updated
by pi in round rl , it can only vote for vlocked,i in the follow-
ing rounds unless validator pi receives a valid value vvalid, j
from the new proposer p j and satisfies rk > rl , where rk is
the round where p j updated its valid value to vvalid, j. Valida-
tor pi can unlock vlocked,i and vote for vvalid, j in the prevote
phase.
The intuition of Tendermint is that at block h at least one correct
validator pi proposed vvalid,i in round rl is acceptable by N− f −1
correct validators. In addition, given any of these N− f −1 correct
validators p j and its locked value vlocked, j in round rk, one of the
following two conditions is always satisfied, vvalid,i = vlocked, j or
rl > rk. This means that every correct validator can always send
precommit message with vvalid,i in the same round and commit a
block on block h. Therefore, correct validators can always com-
mit the same valid value, and hence guarantees the safety property
[13]. Besides, contrary to PBFT, adapting these mechanisms does
not require forwarding additional information (e.g., sending N− f
valid check point messages) to the new proposer.
Tendermint also can be improved by using threshold signatures
[30] for reducing message complexity to improve the scalability.
In addition, the protocol has been proven to achieve fairness un-
der certain conditions [4]. However, since each change of leader
requires waiting for a known upper bound of the network delay,
which may exceed the maximum actual network delay, Tendermint
does not enjoy optimistic responsiveness defined in [29].
The pros and cons of Tendermint are:
• Pros: With a small jury of trusted validators, Tendermint
achieves low latency with safety.
• Cons: Its number of communications is larger than the other
protocols, and therefore, the size of a jury cannot be too
large. This makes Tendermint a good protocol for DataX-
change’s side chains, but not desirable to be its main chain.
3.4.2 Stellar
The Stellar consensus protocol (SCP) is composed of two proto-
cols, the nomination protocol and ballot protocol. These protocols
reach a consensus by using federated voting, which supports flexi-
ble trust. With flexible trust, users can choose any parties they trust
to join the consensus process without a central authority.
More formally, every validator can select a set of valida-
tors to establish a quorum slice. For example, validator pi se-
lects a set of validators denoted as L to form quorum slice
QS(i,L). Validator pi can create multiple quorum slices, or Si =
{Q(i,L1),QS(i,L2), . . . ,QS(i,Ln)}. A quorum slice is defined as a set
of validators sufficient to reach an agreement.
SCP assumes quorum intersection in that two quorum slices
share at least one well-behaved node. SCP is a leaderless PBFT
protocol, and it does not have the pre-prepare phase. However,
SCP adds an accept phase to PPBFT to design its federated voting
scheme to reach global consensus. Thus, federated voting includes
three phases following the order of prepare, accept, and confirm.
1. Prepare. Once a new instance v has been created, pi sends a
message with value v to whomever trusts pi. Once pi votes
for v, it will not vote for other values.
2. Accept. Validator pi receives messages from the validators
in its quorum slices QSi. Validator pi can change its voted
value in the prepare phase if the majority of pi’s blocking set
vote for another value v′ in the prepare phase. Otherwise, pi
still stands for the value v it voted in the accept phase. The
blocking set of pi, Bi, is defined as: for each quorum slice of
pi, QS(i,n) ∈ QSi, such that ∀QS(i,n) ∩Bi 6= /0, which means
Bi contains at least one node in every quorum slice of pi.
3. Confirm. pi broadcasts the value that it voted in the accept
phase, thereby committing to that value.
The reason for the accept phase is that if the value voted by a val-
idator in the prepare phase is different from the value voted by the
majority of its neighbors, the neighbors can convince the valida-
tor to accept the other value. Therefore, although the SCP network
structure can be configured the same as that of PBFT, SCP does not
request a validator to commit a block with N− f of the same votes
in any phases. Instead, validator pi only conveys messages to those
who list pi in their quorum slices.
In summary, SCP provides users with the flexibility to make their
own quorums, and its use of federated voting can lead to consensus
and enjoy the safety property based on the assumptions listed in
the white paper [26]. These assumptions may limit the freedom
of network extension, since validators require adequate settings of
quorum slices.
The pros and cons of SCP are:
• Pros: First, users have the privilege of selecting quorum
slices composed of parties that they can trust. Second, based
on the BFT-based protocol, SCP achieves low latency with
safety.
• Cons: Setting up quorum slices may introduce network struc-
ture errors.
3.4.3 HotStuff
HotStuff is a leader-based BFT protocol in partial synchronous
settings for reaching consensus. HotStuff is a four-phase consensus
protocol including prepare, pre-commit, commit, and decide. (For
details of these phases please refer to [30].) HotSuff fulfills two
properties: linearity and optimistic responsiveness:
• Linearity. The consensus algorithm has a linear communica-
tion complexity for committing a block in one round. Two
scenarios must be considered. First, if a designated proposer
(leader) is correct, the proposed block only takes O (N) mes-
sages (N was defined as the number of validators) to be com-
mitted by the majority. Otherwise, a new proposer must be
elected, known as view-change as defined in Section 3.3, in
the limit of O (N) messages as well. In the worst case, the
total communication cost is O
(
N2
)
for at least f ( f ∝ N)
times proposer selection. We will shortly explain how this
linearity is achieved by HotStuff.
• Optimistic responsiveness. Any correct proposer pi only has
to wait for a delay of N− f messages to ensure that the can-
didate value v that pi proposed can be committed (in view
change mode). This message delay is independent of the
known set upper bound δ on the network’s delay [29].
HotStuff uses two techniques to achieve the linearity property.
First, it adopts a simpler message transmission pattern. Instead of
letting each validator broadcast messages to the others in any con-
sensus phases, HotStuff makes all validators send signed messages
to a designated leader. Then the leader integrates messages into an
agreement. If N− f validator agree on the same content, the result
is broadcast to the other validators to be voted on in the next phase.
Second, HotStuff employs the threshold signature scheme to re-
duce the message complexity. To verify whether an agreement
broadcasted by the leader is actually signed by validators, the
message should contain N − f valid messages signed by valida-
tors. These N− f attached signatures incurO (N2) communication
complexity in the consensus process. However, with the threshold
signature technique, an agreement which only carries one signature
can be verified by validators. With these two schemes, HotStuff can
satisfy linearity.
In the threshold signature scheme, all validators hold a com-
mon public key PUB, but each validator denoted as pi owns a dis-
tinct private key PRIi. A threshold signature ρ can be defined as:
ρ ← combine(m,S), where S = {ρi | pi ∈ V}, V is the set of val-
idators where |V |=N, and |S| ≥N− f ∧ρi← sign(m,PRIi) where
sign(m,PRIi) means validator pi signs the message m with its pri-
vate key PRIi to create the partial signature pi.
Two trade-offs are made in order to achieve linearity. First,
compared to three-phase protocols, HotStuff adds an additional
phase to each view, which causes a small amount of latency [30].
Second, the threshold signature can cost more computational re-
sources. Taking RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) based implementa-
tions of threshold signature schemes as an example, given a (t,n)
threshold signature scheme, at lease t or more participants in a
group of size is n can generate a valid signature collaboratively.
According to the work of [22], the computation complexity can
range from t × TRSA to 3t × TRSA for an individual signature gen-
eration and verification, depending on the feature design choices.
(TRSA represents the time for computing exponent in an RSA-type
scheme.) Also, in Elliptic curve based implementations, generat-
ing an individual signature still requires t times of TEC, the time for
computing a Elliptic curve [18]. In HotStuff, (t,n) is ( f ,N), which
means that the threshold signature scheme could cost f times of
RSA-type schemes or Elliptic-curve-type schemes.
The pros and cons of HotStuff are:
• Pros: HotStuff optimizes the message complexity. Chained
HotStuff also simplifies the algorithm and allows for more
frequent leader rotation.
• Cons: HotStuff adopts a more sophisticated cryptography
mechanism, which takes longer time to reach a consen-
sus, compared to RSA-type schemes or Elliptic-curve-type
schemes.
3.4.4 Hashgraph
The Hashgraph consensus protocol (HCP) is a BFT solution in a
completely asynchronous model. HCP consists of a hashgraph data
structure, a gossip about gossip data-transfer algorithm, and a vir-
tual voting mechanism. We describe these components as follows.
• Hashgraph. A hashgraph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Each validator maintains a local copy of the hashgraph. A
graph node is known as an event, which records a timestamp,
transactions, and two pointers, one pointing to self-parent
event and the other to other-parent event. Creating a new
event can be regarded as proposing a new candidate value.
• Gossip about gossip. Gossip about gossip is a process of
synchronizing two validators’ local hashgraph. Validator pi
randomly selects a peer p j to transfer events that p j does
not known yet. Validator p j only accepts events with valid
signatures and places those events on its hashgraph. Finally,
p j creates a new event e whose pointers link to both pi and
p j. Event e also indicates the fact that pi has shaken hands
with p j.
• Virtual voting.
The virtual voting process is similar to the process of PBFT
in the normal mode. If validator pi verifies the transactions
wrapped in event et−1 to be valid, validator pi creates a new
event et and points et to et−1. Event et will be transferred
when the next round of gossip about gossip process starts.
Otherwise, pi drops et−1. From validator p j’s view, if et
has been sent to N− f validators, HCP defines that p j can
strongly see et−1. The concept of ‘strongly seeing’ is sim-
ilar to ‘going to the next phase’ in PBFT. Moreover, there
are two voting rounds, just like prepare and commit, to con-
firm events. Therefore, every validator has to send each vot-
ing message to other validators directly or indirectly, which
means the message complexity is still O
(
N2
)
• Coin flip. According to the FLP impossibility, it is impos-
sible for a consensus algorithm running on an asynchronous
network to achieve both safety and liveness under node fail-
ure [20]. Therefore, to avoid the impossibility in an asyn-
chronous model, Hashgraph consensus protocol adopts ran-
domized algorithm by allowing validators to flip coins. That
is, a validator periodically votes pseudorandomly depending
on the middle bit of signatures of events. Furthermore, val-
idators do not broadcast coin-flip results since they can tally
votes based on their local copies.
In HCP’s white paper [7], the safety property is proofed. For
liveness, HCP guarantees only termination of all non-faulty pro-
cesses with probability one in its asynchronous model. However,
there is no upper bound of time to reach a consensus. In addition, a
local coin-flip protocol such as Ben-Or [9] requires exponential ex-
pected time to converge in the worst case [5]. Therefore, if Byzan-
tine nodes manipulate the gossip protocol and it takes validators
numerous rounds to reach consensus, the transaction latency can
suffer a great deal.
The pros and cons of Hashgraph are:
• Pros: The message complexity is reduced by an order com-
pared to PBFT. With a small-scale network, HCP can achieve
low latency.
• Cons: Latency can be long in a large-scale network.
3.5 Qualitative Evaluation
In order to provide a qualitative comparison between these pro-
tocols we have enumerated, we collected data from relevant publi-
cations [12, 30, 7, 25]. Table 1 presents a summary including the
following properties:
• Timing model: timing assumptions of different mod-
els including synchronous, asynchronous, and partial syn-
chronous.
Tendermint Stellar HotStuff Hashgraph
Timing Model Partial Synchronous Partial Synchronous Partial Synchronous Asynchronous
Key Design Goals Single mode mechanism Flexible trust 1. Linearity2. Optimistic responsiveness High throughput
Fault Tolerance ≤ 23 Voting Power - ≤ 23 Voting Power ≤ 23 Voting Power
Message Complexity O
(
N2
)
- O
(
N3
)
- O (N) - O
(
N2
)
O
(
N2
)
Scalability 100-1,000 - ≥ 100 ≥ 1,000
Validator Bound 64 43 128 128
Throughput (tx/s) 4k - 10k ≥ 50k
Latency (s) 5 1.3 10 ≥ 10
Benchmark Setup AWS t2.medium AWS c5d.9xlarge AWS c5.4xlarge AWS m4.4xlarge
Table 1: Consensus comparative analysis [12, 25, 30, 7].
• Design goals: the primary performance goals that a consen-
sus algorithm was designed to achieve. This provides the
contextual information for evaluating a protocol. (A proto-
col designed for achieving low latency should not be derided
for its weaknesses in other performance metrics.)
• Fault tolerance: the upper bound of faulty nodes (or weighted
votes) that can cause system failure.
• Message complexity: the overall message complexity to
commit a block. N denotes the number of validators.
• Scalability: the number of validators that the consensus pro-
tocol claims to be able to participate in the consensus pro-
cess.
• Validator bound: the largest number of validators that can
participate in a consensus protocol.
• Throughput: the number of transactions per second that can
be committed by the majority of validators under the largest
number of validators.
• Latency: the average delay before a transaction being com-
mitted under the largest number of validators.
Table 1 shows only the performance data under the largest num-
ber of validators that a protocol can support given its own hardware
configuration and assumptions. In Section 4, we presents our own
experiments attempting to do a relatively fair comparison.
Note that Stellar is absent in most of the fields in Table 1 for two
reasons. First, fault tolerance and message complexity are highly
correlated with the configuration of each validator in the Stellar
network. This flexible configuration makes it difficult to analyze
Stellar without knowing its network structure. Second, the work of
[25] focuses only on reducing latency and assumes that through-
put can be improved by adding hardware. Also note that thought
Table 1 does not provide an apple-to-apple comparison, it provides
a birds-eye view on representative protocols’ characteristics. Al-
though all protocols do their best to optimize performance, we can
still observe a general tradeoff between latency and throughput. For
instance, HCP attempts to optimize throughput, but its latency is
higher than the others. Conversely, Tendermint enjoys low latency
but suffers from relatively low throughput.
4. EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments were designed to evaluate tradeoffs between la-
tency and throughput under different hardware and software con-
figurations. Unfortunately, since there is no stable implementa-
tion of Hashgraph or Hotstuff3 to date, we evaluated only the lat-
est versions of Tendermint and Stellar. We adopted Tendermint
v0.32.1 and Stellar v12.0.0 and deployed them on Google Cloud
Platform (GCP). For Tendermint and Stellar, respectively, we cre-
ated up to 64 validators, and assigned an 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R)
2.20 GHz CPU with 7.2 GB memory to each validator. Validators
were configured into a fully connected topology. To measure real-
istic network latency, we deployed validators on Google servers in
different geographical locations (Taiwan, Singapore, Belgium, and
Columbia). Validators were distributed equally to these locations.
For example, in a 64-validator implementation, 16 validators were
allocated to each of the four geographic locations.
4.1 Metrics
We define throughput and latency based on an end-user’s per-
spective. Given a set of N validators V = {p1, p2, . . . , pN}, through-
put denoted as TPSavg is written as
TPSavg =
ΣNi=1TPS
i
avg
N
, (1)
where TPSiavg denotes the average throughput of validator pi, who
owns a sequence of blocks Bi = {bi0,bi1, . . . ,bH i}. In turn, TPSih
(throughput of the h+1th block of validator pi) is the average
throughput of all transactions in that block, which is obtained by
the number of transactions in the block divided by the commit in-
terval between bih−1 and b
i
h, which is denoted as ∆t
i
h, or
TPSiavg =
ΣHih=0TPS
i
h
Hi
, where TPSih =
|T ih |
∆t ih
.
The latency of a transaction is the time between when the trans-
action is submitted by a client and when the transaction is com-
mitted in a block. Each transaction j may have different la-
tency in V validators’ databases, Latency ji , ∀pi ∈ V . We thus de-
note Latency jmed as the median latency of transaction j among all
V validators. The average latency of T transactions denoted as
Latencyavg can then be written as
Latencyavg =
ΣTj=1Latency
j
med
T
. (2)
3Hashgraph does not provide open-source release. Hotstuff’s open-
source code is not free of bugs as of Q4 2019 to put into production.
(a) Throughput vs. Input Rate. (b) Latency vs. Input Rate.
Figure 3: Performance of Tendermint and Stellar with 4 and 16 Nodes (validators).
4.2 Parameter Settings
Several parameters affect the block commit time, including max-
imum block size, transaction size, commit interval, transaction
weight, and quorum-slice size [30, 12].
• Maximum block size. The maximum number of transactions
that can be included in a block as the block is confirmed.
• Transaction size. The capacity of a transaction in bytes.
• Minimal commit interval. The minimum time increment be-
tween consecutive blocks. A minimum commit interval may
prolong block commit time if an implementation intends to
produce a block whose latency is smaller than the commit
interval. However, we assume that a block’s latency, which
will be no longer than the commit interval, is an acceptable
delay.
• Transaction weight. The probability of a transaction being
committed in a block. All transactions have the same trans-
action weight in our experiments.
• Quorum slice. In Stellar, each validator has its quorum slice
[26]. To achieve a fully connected network, each validator’s
quorum slice is comprised of the rest of the validators so that
all validators join the quorum and there is no dispensable set.
Maximum block size Transaction size Commit interval
3,000 transactions/ block 212 bytes 5 seconds
Table 2: Parameter Settings for Tendermint and Stellar
We used the parameter settings listed in Table 2 to compare Ten-
dermint and Stellar, Both implementations were issued the same
workload of a large number of synthetic transactions. To simulate
realistic client behavior, we used a separate node to submit trans-
actions to validators continuously for 60 seconds 4. This node sent
transactions in different input rates up to 1,200 transactions/s in a
round-robin fashion.
4Our initial experiments indicated that the block commit intervals
of both Tendermint and Stellar can be stabilized in 60 seconds. To
conserve AWS budget, we therefore ran all experiments for 60 sec-
onds.
4.3 Throughput and Latency Comparison
Figure 3 presents the performance of both implementations with
4 and 16 validators (or CPU nodes). (Later in the scalability study,
we present performance with larger number of nodes.) With 4 val-
idators (or nodes), Tendermint and Stellar have nearly the same
performance when the input rate is under 300. However, when
input rates exceed 400 transactions/s, Tendermint achieves higher
throughput and lower latency. The gap between the two protocols
widens as the input rate is further increased.
Figure 4: Throughput vs. latency of Tendermint and Stellar with
4 and 16 nodes. In each dashed line, the consecutive vertices rep-
resent the input rate increases, starting from 100 transactions/s and
increasing by 100 transactions/s each time.
Furthermore, we examine peak performance, which is defined
as the highest throughput with the lowest latency. In Figure 4, we
plot throughput (x-axis) and latency (y-axis) tradeoff for 4 and 16
validators of Tendermint and Stellar, respectively. The nodes on
each line represent the input rates from 100 per second onward by
increments of 100 per second. As an example, for Stellar-4 (Stellar
with 4 validators), its throughput initially steadily increases from an
input rate of 100 to 400 transactions/s, but then begins to degrade
as the input rate increases beyond 400 transactions/s.
Meanwhile, latency grows rapidly (beyond the upper bound of
the figure after input rate is larger than 600 transactions/s) when
throughput starts to degrade due to saturation of system resources.
This resource-saturation problem suggests to us that admission
control and load balancing must be implemented in a production
system.
The peak performance of Stellar-4 is around 350 transaction-
s/s with 10 seconds latency at an input rate of 400 transactions/s.
Tendermint-4 can reach a performance of 490 transactions/s with
5 seconds latency at an input rate of 500 transactions/s. Increasing
the number of validators from 4 to 16, the performance gap widens.
In summary, in low traffic situations (under 300 transactions/s),
Tendermint-4 and Stellar-4 perform at about the same level. How-
ever, with heavier traffic, Tendermint outperforms Stellar.
4.4 Scalability
This section presents results of our scalability study. Figure 5
depicts Tendermint’s through and latency at input rates increased
from 200 to 1,200 transactions/s. Stellar’s performance exhibits
the same patents as Tendermint’s, and we do not separately present
its data. We report Tendermint vs. Stellar comparison in Figure 6.
From Figure 5[a], we observe that the throughput of Tendermint
eventually saturates and degrades after the input rate has reached
the capacity of the system. Throughput degradation occurs at a
lower input rate when the number of validators (the number of
nodes) are larger. The degradation point of 16-node Tendermint
is at input rate 450 transactions/s, while the degradation point of
64-node configuration starts at 250. Figure 5[b] depicts latency
versus input rate. At the same input rate when throughput starts to
degrade, the latency of Tendermint also increases drastically. For
smaller configurations from 4 to 16 nodes latency reaches 50 sec-
onds at input rate 1,200, whereas for lager configurations 32 and
64 latency reaches two minutes.
It is expected that system capacity eventually limits throughput
and latency. To improve overall Soteria throughout at a guaran-
teed latency, we can configure a 32-node system with an admis-
sion control that limits the input rate to be under 450 transactions/s.
This configuration can support throughput up to 450 transactions/s
with 10-second latency. When the overall throughput requirement
is higher than 450, Soteria can configure another 32-node system
to satisfy throughput scalability at the same latency level.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper presented Soteria, consisting of a user right man-
agement system (URM), a distributed ledger (DLT), and a audit-
ing service (ATS) to support provable, auditable and scalable data
governance. To protect consumer rights of privacy and to comply
with data-privacy regulations, we design Soteria to fulfill the func-
tional requirements of consent, record keeping, and transparency
(for auditing). We presented the architecture of Soteria, its func-
tional specifications, and protocol choices for its base chain and
side chains. On protocol selection, we qualitatively evaluated four
algorithms and experimented with two readily deployable protocols
Tendermint and Stellar, and select Tendermint to be our side-chain
protocol because of its scalability in throughput and latency.
We have deployed Soteria at a hospital chain, and experiment
with a news aggregator to facilitate them being CCPA-compliant.
As the user base is expected to grow, our future work will address
various performance optimization issues that will arise with URM
and DLT. Three specific topics are:
(a) Throughput vs. Input Rate.
(b) Latency vs. Input Rate.
Figure 5: Tendermint Performance with 4 to 64 Nodes (Validators)
• SQL optimization. In Section 2.3, we note that the SQL
query, while correct, might not be very efficient, as it in-
cludes at least one clause for each owner of the data in the
database. In our experience, this is sufficient, as in prac-
tice the same sharing agreement is used by many differ-
ent consumers, so clauses can be unified when the query is
constructed. As consumers’ preferences become more fine-
grained, this might not be the case. Future work should
investigate an optimization algorithm or an index structure
suitable to queries of this form, so that both performance and
formal correctness can be maintained.
• Inter-chain protocol optimization. How often side chains
should hash a block onto the main chain affects Soteria’s la-
tency and throughput. While Soteria may have full control on
the parameters of its side chains, the main, public chain (such
as Ethereum classic) can be shared with other applications.
Soteria should look into dynamic adjustment policies on its
side-chain block size and hash (to the main chain) frequency.
• Interoperability with native access control policies. Most
(a) Throughput vs. # of Nodes. (b) Latency vs. # of Nodes.
Figure 6: Performance of Tendermint vs. Stellar at Input Rates 100, 500, and 900.
companies have had their own access control policies and/or
tools. For instance, Zelkova [6] developed by AWS is an
SMT-based (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) reasoning tool
for analyzing security/privacy policies and their risks. We
will investigate how Soteria can complement existing tools.
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